The Loya Jirga: Afghanistan on the road to recovery?
Under the terms of the Bonn Agreement of 5 December, 2001 an Emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul from 11-19 June. One thousand of the 1,051 participants were elected. They included 200 women. Their primary purpose was to select a transitional government for Afghanistan for the next 18 months.
Encouragingly, the event passed off without major incident and provided a unique opportunity for power holders and representatives of civil society to meet. The new cabinet endorsed by the delegates offers a degree of continuity, with Hamid Karzai being elected President, thirteen of the 31 portfolios remaining in the same hands and a further six ministers remaining within the cabinet with new portfolios. All the major power holders and ethnic groups are represented, both through the ministerial portfolios and through the appointment of five Vice-Presidents. There are three female cabinet members. The cabinet includes a number of people who have been active in civil society organisations.
Less positively, the Loya Jirga format did not allow debate on the suitability of names put forward for official posts. Efforts to agree on the formation of a legislature failed. The intimidatory tactics adopted by some power holders during the electoral process were in evidence at the Loya Jirga. Many of the delegates demonstrated great courage in speaking out on human rights issues but may have overstepped the mark and be at risk on their return to their home areas. There was much frustration that the Loya Jirga was effectively lending a seal of approval to decisions made elsewhere. Supporters of the former King, Zahir Shah, were unhappy that Zalmay Khalilzad, the Special Representative of the US government, announced prior to the Loya Jirga that Zahir Shah would not be a candidate for the position of head of state. The final choice of cabinet members also failed to satisfy those Pushtuns fearful of the prominent role played by members of the former Northern Alliance in the interim administration. The re-appointment of General Fahim in the Defence Ministry, and his designation as one of the Vice-Presidents, has been badly received. Preferring not to be based in Kabul, the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostam declined a Cabinet post. One of the Vice-Presdents, Haji Abdul Qadir, one of the few Pushtuns in the administration, was assassinated a month after the Loya Jirga.
The Loya Jirga seems to have created an interim government which reflects existing power-holding arrangements at the local level. It is also a government which is being careful not to disregard Islamic values or conservative opinion. Whether the Loya Jirga will be regarded as a milestone on Afghanistan's road to peace will depend on the ability of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to bring the regional power holders into an acceptance of the value of operating within a national framework and also on its ability to encourage adherence to internationally-accepted human rights standards.
Human Right's Watch Loya Jirga report is at www.hrw.org/press/2002/04/qna-loyagirga.htm and that of EurasiaNet at www.eurasianet.org/loya.jirga . For frequently updated information on Afghanistan, subscribe to the British Agencies of Afghanistan Group (BAAG) monthly newsletter. Email: baag@refugeecouncil.org.uk . Also see the Afghanistan links on the FMR website at: www.fmreview.org/4DAfghanistan.htm
Global Consultations on International Protection: 3rd Track by Fred Robarts
Hosted by UNHCR's Department for International Protection (DIP), the Global Consultations process aims to revitalise the international protection regime, paying particular attention to issues not adequately covered by the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol. The 'third track', using the framework of UNHCR's Executive Committee, has produced a degree of consensus on protection aspects of mass influx situations, individual asylum systems and the asylum/migration nexus. The final meeting of the third track concerned the different 'durable solutions', refugee women and refugee children.
Voluntary repatriation remains the preferred solution for the majority of refugees. Discussions focused on the concept of safe, voluntary return, what constitutes a conducive environment for sustainable return and the responsibilities of host states, UNHCR, other agencies and donors in post-conflict recovery scenarios. UNHCR was encouraged to play a predominantly catalytic role, focusing on protection, standard setting, advocacy, monitoring and effective partnerships. More guidance on legal issues such as land and property rights was also requested. The NGO position was that anything less than voluntary return would violate the essential principle of non-refoulement. The UK drew attention to the protection needs of those who do not return.
There were several references to protracted refugee situations: the distant prospect of voluntary return did not justify lengthy 'warehousing' of refugees; conditions were likely to worsen over time due to host country and donor fatigue. More effort should be made by all concerned both to avoid the creation of protracted situations by looking for durable solutions from the outset, and to help resolve them, including through diplomatic means.
The need for international protection through resettlement exceeds the number of places available through existing quotas. States were urged to initiate or expand resettlement programmes, and to work together, with UNHCR's assistance, to establish more consistent, efficient resettlement procedures. Aside from the duty to provide protection, this would help demonstrate to countries of first asylum that richer states are willing to share responsibility. In this way, the asylum institution would be preserved, and the viability of other solutions would be reinforced.
Local integration represents an attractive solution where repatriation is not an option, although host countries are often unwilling to grant the rights to free movement, work, land, citizenship, etc. This solution could be promoted by ensuring that refugee and host areas are incorporated into national development plans, with donor support. Working examples can be found in Zambia, Uganda and Ethiopia.
In lieu of local integration, there is a compelling rationale for enabling increased self-reliance of refugees as a dignified, sustainable alternative to dependency. DIP suggested that "a self-reliant community could replace 20 protection officers". In this context, UNHCR could usefully develop understanding of the concept of social (rather than legal or physical) protection.
There was consensus that UNHCR still needs to address the protection of refugee women and children more centrally. A strong framework of guidelines and evaluation recommendations exists, with some encouraging examples of good practice. However, implementation remains inconsistent; implementing partners and donors share some responsibility for this.
States parties do not stand up to scrutiny in many instances. They also reminded the meeting that good practice and successes receive too little attention.
Conclusions from the process, in the form of recommendations for action, have been summarised in a shared 'Agenda for Protection' to be presented to UNHCR's Executive Committee in October. Further, inclusive working groups are expected to discuss implementation and address new issues as they arise. Advocacy groups can help to ensure that joint action to strengthen the international protection regime ensues.
Background on the process is available on UNHCR's website: www.unhcr.ch. Fred Robarts works at the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department at the UK Department for International Development.